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Law’s Visual Afterlife
Violence, Popular Culture, and Translation Theory
Naomi Mezey
It’s 1876, just after the Battle of Little Bighorn, and Seth Bullock has given 
up his position as marshall in Montana Territory and has gone to the Black 
Hills of Dakota Territory to set up a make- shift hardware shop with his 
partner Sol Star in the gold- rush town of Deadwood. In the eponymous 
HBO series, the town of Deadwood is portrayed as a muddy, violent, law-
less, and illegal town in the heart of Indian country where everyone is try-
ing to make a fortune and stay alive. In his ﬁnal act as marshall, Bullock 
hung a horse thief rather than allow him to die at the hands of a mob that 
had come for him. In giving the man a “legal” killing, Bullock acts out in 
this ﬁrst scene of Deadwood, the role that will follow him into Dakota Ter-
ritory: that of a reluctant lawman in a liminal, lawless place. This television 
scene enacts a primal scene within law—the use of violence in the making 
and maintaining of the state and the internalizing of violence under the 
authority claimed by the state.
 In 1775, a century before Seth Bullock headed to Deadwood, the chiefs 
of the Illinois and Piankeshaw tribes granted title to certain of their lands 
to private individuals. This title was later contested by others who had ac-
quired title to the land through federal land grants, and in 1823 Justice 
John Marshall authored an opinion in which the U.S. Supreme Court was 
forced to decide whether Indians have the authority to transfer title to 
lands they occupy. It was, in effect, a question of who was the legitimate 
owner of lands within the United States occupied by Indians, of how per-
vasive the authority was which had been claimed by the European powers, 
the colonies, and then the state. In Johnson v. M’Intosh, Marshall enacts 
another version of this primal scene: he declares that the Indians’ right to 
title of their land was defeated by the “fundamental principle” of discov-
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ery recognized by all the Christian peoples of Europe, a principle which 
allowed civilized nations to take title to and possession of lands occupied 
by heathens and which was limited only by “the prior title of any Chris-
tian people who may have made a previous discovery.”1
 In Johnson v. M’Intosh, the aptly named Marshall not only decides the 
disposition of the land at issue in this case, but goes on to justify the au-
thority of the United States over all the lands within its claimed territory, 
in clud ing those never wrested from the Indians. It is, in a real- estate sense, 
a legal killing. His opinion, moreover, is one marked by a certain awareness 
of how grandiose the claims to authority over the territory of the country 
are, how momentous the decision, and that awareness makes the rhe tori-
cal performance all the more exhaustively and violently asserted. The as-
sertion of the territorial legitimacy of the United States and, paradoxically, 
the subsequent legal legitimation of the violence that was necessary in 
order to secure the territory is obsessively rehearsed in Marshall’s opinion 
for the Court.
 Representations of the violent conquest of the territory of the United 
States and the violence necessary to law is so obsessively rehearsed in popu-
lar culture as to merit is own ﬁlm genre—the western. To a lesser extent, 
science ﬁction has also specialized in performing the cultural and legal 
anxiety over state authority and violence, although generally from the per-
spective of the demise of state order rather than the birth of the state. But 
why? My interest is in the way popular culture so consistently engages in 
visual translations of law’s repressed yet recurring preoccupation with the 
violence that makes law possible and that simultaneously maintains and 
unsettles the legitimacy of the state. Thinking about popular cultural de-
pictions of law as translation can help us unpack the layers and complexi-
ties of legal representations in popular culture and help us explain how 
they circulate as they do. But to speak of “representation” and “transla-
tion” is to risk perpetuating the ﬁction that while popular culture continu-
ally portrays or sketches legal scenes, it always speaks in a language that 
is not law’s language; it suggests that culture is never law. But ﬁlms act as 
a form of juridical communication just as law acts as a form of cultural 
transmission. As Desmond Manderson and Laurie Ouellette make espe-
cially clear in their contributions to this anthology, ﬁlm and television are 
not just depictions of law, but agents of law.2 Law, likewise, is an agent of 
culture. Films, most especially westerns, are part of the evolution and re-
iteration of the national preoccupation with law’s founding violence and 
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state legitimacy, and the cultural power they generate circulates back into 
the law.3
 In his essay “The Task of the Translator,” Walter Benjamin argues that 
translations enable a work’s afterlife. The afterlife is not what happens 
after death but what allows a work (or event or idea) to go on living and 
to evolve over time and place and iteration. In its afterlife, the original is 
transformed and renewed. This chapter explores ﬁlm’s visual translation 
of law and the role ﬁlm plays in law’s afterlife. Benjamin’s theory of trans-
lation is useful because it suggests that ﬁlm translates law not so much by 
translating from one language to another, or from one discrete domain 
to another, but by continuing one idea or story in a slightly different but 
equally potent discourse. The cultural- critical lens of translation high-
lights the discursive similarities and dissonances between law and ﬁlm; it 
allows us to see the legal power of popular visual culture and the cultural 
power of the law; and it gives us new purchase on thinking about the ways 
that words, images, power, and violence operate in and circulate through 
different social arenas. I take up the western series Deadwood and the sci-
ence ﬁction–western ﬁlm Serenity to explore the representations of state 
legitimacy and violence at the imagined borderland of time, place, and au-
thority as well as to illustrate the layers of legal translation that ﬁlm can 
occasion and their effects on law’s afterlife.
 My argument focuses on how a few speciﬁc legal- cultural scenes trans-
late the dilemmas of state authority, violence, and legal legitimacy into the 
visual, but it is also because these scenes are illustrative that the argument 
encompasses the genres from which these images come. Both the western 
and science ﬁction, as genres, offer two parallel narratives about a foun-
dational legal problem—the relationship of the state to violence and the 
paradox of the law’s own legitimacy. The narratives of the western tend 
to be progressive yet nostalgic; they are stories about the founding of the 
state, the coming of civilization, the taming of the frontier, and the largely 
successful efforts of the state to displace the Indians and reign in excessive 
private violence by exercising a monopoly on violence. But the images and 
stories of westerns are often deeply nostalgic for the kind of men—moral 
individualists—who were the more masculine precursors to the state but 
whose existence is incompatible with state power. By portraying the ques-
tionable violence used by the state in order to secure its authority and the 
claiming of an exclusive right to violence on the basis of that authority, 
westerns can easily be read as critiques of the state and of state legitimacy 
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and power. Indeed, westerns often read as fantasies of a particular kind of 
freedom, freedom from both the state and state- ordered morality as it is 
embodied in law.
 The narratives of science ﬁction are more often dystopic, and its sto-
ries about law and violence come in (at least) two versions. In one ver-
sion, science ﬁction portrays the state as perfecting its monopoly on vio-
lence to the point of abuse. The state itself becomes the perpetrator of 
excessive violence. Another version of the science ﬁction genre narrates 
the future breakdown of the state, the dissolution of its monopoly on 
force and the return to private violence. This sec ond version is a marriage 
of the two genres into a futuristic western. These two ﬁlm genres—the 
western and the sci- ﬁ western—often translate the legal anxiety over the 
state’s unstable and paradoxical relationship to violence in such a way as 
to give new and visual life to its persistent instability, an instability that 
is mostly suppressed in legal discourse. Thinking about the complimen-
tarity of westerns and science ﬁction, seeing them as two sides of the same 
coin, also illuminates the conceptual artiﬁciality of the dilemma violence 
appears to present within each genre. As po liti cal and legal theorists have 
long argued, law and violence are not opposites, but one in the same. Law 
does not prevent violence and violence does not symbolize a breakdown of 
law. Law and violence require each other.4 In its translation into ﬁlm, this 
rather radical legal idea has its compelling afterlife.
 The western and science ﬁction both represent life on the borderlands of 
time and society. Set in the past or the future, the borderlands of the pres-
ent, westerns and science ﬁction movies are nonetheless made in vari ous 
presents. Each genre is “always historicized, grounded . . . in the economic, 
technological, political, social, and linguistic present of its production, in 
the ideological structures that shape its visual and visible conceptions of 
time, space, affect, and social relations.”5 Both genres convey in their im-
ages and their moods a sense of being outside of the constraints of the 
present. These genres also often portray the borderlands of law, law in its 
alleged absence, its unrealized ambitions, its excess, and are peopled by 
outlaws or those who exist on the fringes of the permissible. They indulge 
a fantasy of lawlessness. It is a fantasy because the violence evident in these 
visual portrayals does not signal, as Manderson makes vivid in his discus-
sion of portrayals of torture in 24, an “abandonment of law” but a “theory 
of law.”6
 In order to translate law’s unstable relationship to violence, ﬁlm puts 
the viewer on the borderlands of both time and society, in the position of 
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the past or future outlaw, and outside the stability of legal and moral order. 
Thus the translation is multiplied. It is not just thematic—the translation 
of ideas about law, the state, and violence—but also temporal and dis-
cursive. Temporally, these ﬁlms translate law into the past and the future 
through the lens of the present. Discursively, they translate the rheto ric 
and mythologies of the law into the visual mythologies of ﬁlm and tele-
vision. Again, this is not to suggest that law and visual popular culture 
are two distinct domains or languages as much as they represent differ-
ent kinds of storytelling and interpretation, and translation functions as 
a theory of meta- interpretation, a way to move between distinctive inter-
pretive approaches.
On Translation
In general, it can be said that Mardrus does not translate the book’s 
words but its scenes.
—Jorge Luis Borges
Translation has proved to be a fertile ground for theorizing because it is 
at once an impossible, necessary, and contradictory task: it struggles val-
iantly with the way language creates and evades meaning; it demonstrates 
the simultaneous ability and inability of people to bridge the linguistic di-
versity of the world; and it suggests, at least in the context of languages, 
the heroism of a dedication to failure. Because there is “no absolute corre-
spondence between languages . . . there can be no fully exact translation.”7 
A task that is doomed from the start is always compelling—it inspires the 
optimists to keep trying for success and it beguiles the pessimist with the 
narratives of lost causes. At its most concrete, translation is about trans-
posing one language into another. Sometimes thought of as reproducing, 
rendering, or miming, and more rarely as interpretation, translation is ﬁrst 
and foremost and quite concretely about language. In my usage, transla-
tion is still about language, but it insists on a view of language as always in-
terpretive and necessarily metaphorical and literary. I am using translation 
to convey what Roman Jakobson has called “intersemiotic transposition— 
from one system of signs into another,”8 from the “language” that is the 
foundation of legal interpretation to the “language” of ﬁlmic and visual 
interpretation.
 Walter Benjamin writes about translation in a distinctly nonmetaphori-
cal sense; he is concerned with the translation of literary work from one 
language into another. Yet his thinking on the subject is so suggestive and 
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dynamic that it is particularly well suited to theorizing the circulatory re-
lationship between law’s violence and ﬁlm’s. Benjamin has famously ar-
gued that translation is not about capturing a likeness to the original, but 
of securing a future for the original. It produces an “afterlife” in which a 
work of art endures, although the endurance is far from static. “For in its 
afterlife—which could not be called that if it were not a transformation 
and a renewal of something living—the original undergoes a change.”9 
The change Benjamin is interested in is the changing meanings at the 
very heart of language itself, a process made even more dynamic and vivid 
when languages change each other through translation. The change occa-
sioned by translation is all the more striking when “the original” is in fact 
not text, but is instead a social concept, a paradox or a problem fundamen-
tal to one discourse that is translated into another discourse, as it is when 
ﬁlm takes up, performs, and circulates the “problem” of law’s violence and 
the state’s legitimacy. It is not farfetched to say that like literary transla-
tions, ﬁlmic translations of law change the meanings and methods of law 
as well.
 The task of the translator, for Benjamin, is not to faithfully transmit in-
formation or even convey the proper meaning, but to ﬁnd the “intended 
effect upon the language into which he is translating which produces in it 
the echo of the original.”10 This is another way of describing popular cul-
tural representations of law.11 As Manderson argues, popular culture, as it 
circulates “earlier modes of thinking” about the law, is “an echo, a counter-
point, a trace.”12 It is, in other words, an important part of law’s after-
life. Thus it is that Benjamin has less interest in the twin concerns that 
have traditionally guided assessment of translations: ﬁdelity and freedom. 
“These ideas seem to be no longer serviceable to a theory that looks for 
other things in a translation than reproduction of meaning.”13 In trans-
lating the paradox of state authority and law’s violence, ﬁlms are not re-
producing the authoritative meaning of any particular original text, nor 
are they unproblematically conveying a legal idea. They are instead en-
suring the afterlife of a central idea or anxiety within law by ritualizing 
and rethinking the problem through the lens of a different interpretive 
method. And because translation implies a relationship, law’s visual after-
life in ﬁlm reengages law and changes the way we think about the legal 
anxieties that it translates.
 Homi Bhabha likens the task of translation to the postcolonial experi-
ence, cultural difference, and how newness enters the world. In this con-
text, the question is not what is lost in translation but what resists trans-
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lation and is untranslatable.14 Bhabha understands translation as “the 
performative nature of cultural communication” and in this sense is inter-
ested in the “movement of meaning,” or the foreign element that disrupts 
cultural understanding.15 Similarly, I envision law and popular culture as 
two distinct forms of cultural communication where each often performs 
the other. Bhabha’s theory of translation is also productive because it high-
lights the disruptions that are occasioned by law’s visual afterlife. There 
are many gaps and absences in the law, only one example of which are the 
absences that attend law’s story of its own legitimacy. This gap is both ob-
sessively translated into ﬁlm and television and it also resists translation, 
because to make it visible obscures the violence done by glossing over it, as 
Marshall does in M’Intosh. Lastly, Bhabha is important because the scenes 
of law’s extralegal origin that I canvas in this chapter all take place in the 
context of colonial encounters, either in the confrontation between an as-
piring state and its native inhabitants (as in M’Intosh and Deadwood), or 
in the imperial ambitions of a future alliance between the United States 
and China (as in Serenity).
 To consider the ﬁlmic translations of law’s violence is to think about in-
tersemiotic transposition, the transposing of violent “scenes” within the law, 
scenes that have animated legal discourse for centuries, onto the screen, 
where the style of the translated violence has animated entire visual genres. 
Borges has suggested that the freedom to translate scenes rather than words 
belongs to the illustrator rather than the translator.16 But when one trans-
lates from law to ﬁlm, the translator is an illustrator. Despite the textuality 
of script and dialogue, movies are primarily visual. As Abe Mark Nornes 
has noted, in considering the translation of movie subtitles, in ﬁlm “ev-
ery element of verbal and visual language is read off the image.”17 Law’s 
force must be translated from text, rhetoric, and myth to image and narra-
tion. Law can “look” like law when it is visual, but can it “act” like law, can 
it command, take, punish, give?
 James Boyd White has brought the idea of translation to the law most 
explicitly, and in his justly famous book, Justice as Translation, he tends to 
think about translation in a way that is very compatible with Benjamin, as 
“a reiteration of what was said before in a new context where it can have a 
life that is at once old and new.”18 For White, translation is a method that 
is natural to law, which requires old laws to be applied to new contexts, 
which must translate past precedent into present judgments. White makes 
clear the way in which law, like ﬁlm, is at heart a mode of interpretation. 
Part of his originality lies in conceiving of legal method as an aesthetic and 
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literary endeavor. “The process of giving life to old texts by placing them 
in new ways and in new relations is of course familiar to us as lawyers. It 
is how the law lives and grows and transforms itself, for the law is nothing 
if not a way of paying attention and respect to what is outside ourselves: 
to texts made by others in the past, which we regard as authoritative, and 
to texts made in the present by our fellow citizens, to which we listen. We 
try to place texts of both sorts in patterns of what has been and what will 
be, and these patterns are themselves compositions. The law is thus at 
its heart an interpretive and compositional—and in this sense a radically 
literary— activity.”19 Likewise, the circulation of law and popular culture 
ensures that cultural representations of legal problems bring new images 
and ideas that can become the bases for future legal thinking. Filmic im-
ages are the cultural common law.
 For White, translation is about relationships and the relationships that 
language itself requires; “it is the art of facing the impossible, of confront-
ing unbridgeable discontinuities between texts, between languages, and 
between people.”20 White sees justice and law as engaged in the same fun-
damental activity as translation, that of “talking about right relations” be-
tween languages and between people.21
Law’s Violence
Every legal order must conceive of itself in one way or another as emerg-
ing out of that which is itself unlawful.
—Robert Cover
The scenes of legal violence in the origins of the state, and the founding of 
the United States in particular, have been a source of interest and anxiety 
within legal theory and practice. Theorists have long observed both the 
inherent violence of law and the anxiety this paradoxical fact occasions.22 
Law requires violence for its authority and yet it purports to be authori-
tative and legitimate precisely in its ability to displace violence as the pri-
mary form of authority. As Robert Cover has said, “Neither legal inter-
pretation nor the violence it occasions may be properly understood apart 
from one another.”23 Though primarily concerned with legal interpreta-
tion, Cover’s assessment applies with equal force to any social institution: 
“A legal world is built only to the extent that there are commitments that 
place bodies on the line.”24
 Perhaps the classic statement of law’s dependence on violence is from 
Hobbes, who deﬁned law as simply commands that are backed by force.25 
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Whereas Hobbes envisioned the state of nature as anarchy and constant 
war, the state itself he saw as simply the productive organization of vio-
lence and power. It requires the “terrour of some Power” to make men ob-
serve law’s commands and “feare of punishment” to perform their cove-
nants.26 The emergence of the state, of sovereigns and subjects, is an act 
of self- preservation and it brings peace only by lodging violence in a body 
beyond the individual. The Leviathan is erected by men conferring their 
power upon one man or an assembly of men, and whether the state is 
formed by choice or by force, the power of the sovereign is based on the 
same thing as the power of the individual: violence, terror, and domina-
tion. Hobbes makes this explicit when he notes that if it were true that 
covenants that proceed from fear of death or violence are void, then “no 
man, in any kind of Common- wealth, could be obliged to Obedience.”27 
As Martha Umphrey puts it, Hobbes imagines that “the escape into civi-
lization leads only to a more mediated form of terror.”28
 Likewise, John Austin, in his inﬂuential articulation of legal positivism, 
takes his deﬁnition of law from Hobbes. Law for Austin is a command, 
and a command is by deﬁnition that which is backed by violence. “If you 
are able and willing to harm me in case I comply not with your wish, the 
expression of your wish amounts to a command.”29 For Austin, the supe-
rior or sovereign that makes law gains this power through might—“the 
power of affecting others with evil or pain, and of forcing them, through 
fear of that evil, to fashion their conduct to one’s wishes.”30 As Austin po-
etically points out, while might usually resides in the sovereign, it also 
“slumbers in the multitude.”31 It is the power and might of the slumbering 
multitude, in fact, that makes the state’s power and legitimacy so fragile.
 H.L.A. Hart vigorously tried to defend a position that law was not just 
coercive orders, but rules whose primary appeal was “not to fear but to re-
spect for authority.”32 But as Hart himself admitted, the nature and le-
gitimacy of that authority is obscure. In a circular sort of logic, general or 
fundamental rules—those meta rules in representative po liti cal systems 
that govern lawmaking and confer authority to legislate—themselves le-
gitimate the state because they are not merely the terms by which society 
obeys the sovereign, but “are constitutive of the sovereign.”33 But this rhe-
tori cal haven of rules still can’t save us from a system founded on vio-
lence.34
 Law’s violence is not only a problem for law, insomuch as law can be 
thought of as a promise to protect us from violence, but it is also a paradox. 
As Austin Sarat has articulated it: “Law without violence is unthinkable, 
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yet if law were to be no more than violence it would not be law at all. . . . 
But the violence on which law depends always threatens the values for 
which law stands. Some of this violence is done directly by legal ofﬁcials, 
some by citizens acting under a dispensation granted by law, and some by 
persons whose violent acts subsequently will be deemed acceptable.”35
 When the violent acts that are subsequently deemed acceptable by the 
law are the acts that help found and maintain the state, whose sovereignty 
legitimates the law, then the paradox of law’s violence is most vivid.
 Perhaps nowhere is the paradox of law’s violence and the violence of 
legal interpretation so clearly instantiated than in Justice Marshall’s opin-
ion in Johnson v. M’Intosh. As noted earlier, Marshall had to decide who 
owned the land in dispute: the plaintiffs who purchased the land from the 
Piankeshaw Indians or the defendant who received a land grant from the 
United States Government. But of course this case was about much more 
than a dispute about a particular piece of property in Illinois; it was about 
the right of the new United States to the vast expanse of property that 
it did not or could not win entirely by conquest or treaty and about the 
centrality of the right of property in the law and economy of the grow-
ing state.
 Marshall justiﬁed the territorial claims of the United States and de-
nied any property rights for Indians by hinging his opinion on the prin-
ciple of discovery. He held that while the Indians chiefs who sold their 
land were in rightful possession, they did not own the soil because such 
ownership conﬂicted with the claims of the United States, and the ﬁrst 
principle of property is that absolute title cannot exist in two different 
people or two different governments at the same time.36 It was this prin-
ciple of discov ery that was recognized by the European nations compet-
ing for the newly found continent and that was used to regulate their con-
ﬂicting ambitions. “It was a right which all asserted for themselves, and to 
the assertion of which, by others, all assented.”37 Once asserted and rec-
ognized by the European powers, the primary rights that ﬂowed from dis-
covery were the exclusive rights to title and to appropriate the lands oc-
cupied by the Indians, by treaty, purchase, or conquest. Here was the legal 
justiﬁcation for violence— that discovery gives the right to appropriate 
through conquest—but it was circular and paradoxical because the sover-
eign law that provides for discovery, the principle upon which violence is 
legally allowed, is itself founded and legitimated through the violent con-
quest that creates the state and the law.
 In M’Intosh Marshall narrates the “history of America, from its dis-
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covery to the present day” in order to prove the “universal recognition 
of these principles.”38 He recounts how each of the European powers 
made acquisitions in America on the basis of discovery and grants from 
their own sovereign, and nowhere was this more true than of England, 
whose monarchs gave numerous grants to settle colonies. The 1609 char-
ter for James town, for example, granted “in absolute property, the lands 
extending along the seacoast four hundred miles, and the land through-
out from sea to sea.”39 After quoting the grants of land that accompanied 
many other charters from the crown, Marshall concludes: “Thus has our 
whole country been granted by the crown while in the occupation of the 
Indians. These grants purport to convey the soil as well as the right of do-
minion to the  grantees. . . . It has never been objected to this, or to any 
other similar grant, that the title as well as possession was in the Indians 
when it was made, and that it passed nothing on that account.”40
 The idea that these charters to faraway lands could have been void or 
nulliﬁed by the claims of those already in possession of the land is, accord-
ing to Marshall, an absurdity. It is an absurdity, Marshall almost admits, 
not because of any principle of law but because the audacious claims in 
fact succeeded and hence became the law. “However extravagant the pre-
tension of converting the discovery of an inhabited country into conquest 
may appear; if the principle has been asserted in the ﬁrst instance, and 
afterwards sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under it; if 
the property of the great mass of the community originates in it, it becomes 
the law of the land, and cannot be questioned.”41 As Jedediah Purdy notes in 
his excellent analysis of M’Intosh, it is problematic as a property law case 
precisely because of its open endorsement of colonial violence.42
 The legal violence of Johnson v. M’Intosh is both in the word and in the 
act. It is violent in its rheto ric and legal interpretation, insisting as legal 
opinions always insist, on a particular way of understanding the law that 
guides the court’s judgment, and suggesting, as legal opinions sometimes 
suggest, that there is no alternative to this understanding of the law. In-
deed, M’Intosh reads as if there were no other options than to decide the 
case based on the doctrine of discovery at the very same time that it ac-
knowledges the audaciousness of the result. There were no other legal op-
tions or outcomes available not because law or history foreclosed them, 
but because Marshall, in his opinion, makes it so—the legal right of the 
state to land in possession of Indians is asserted and created by Marshall 
himself in the act of writing for the Court, and it cannot be questioned. 
The instability in the relationship between law and violence surfaces and 
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is violently repressed by Marshall. It exists as an echo. The law asserted in 
the opinion is justiﬁed in part because it has never been doubted, because 
the opinion insists that the story it tells is one of uniform agreement on 
the rights that ﬂow from discovery, and where there is doubt, it is justi-
ﬁed by the violence of conquest itself. “The United States, then, have un-
equivocally acceded to that great and broad rule by which its civilized in-
habitants now hold this country. They hold, and assert in themselves, the 
title by which it was acquired. They maintain, as all others have main-
tained, that discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title 
of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest; and gave also a right to 
such degree of sovereignty, as the circumstances of the people would al-
low them to exercise.”43
 But of course Marshall’s narrative was not the only story that could 
have been told, even if the outcome of M’Intosh was overdetermined by 
the time the case was decided. There were options other than the doctrines 
of discovery and conquest that Marshall could have used to decide the 
case, options that might have been easier to justify. For example,  Phillip 
Frickey, in his classic article on Marshall’s Indian Law Trilogy,44 locates a 
deep tension in M’Intosh between the imperatives of colonialism and ex-
pansion on the one hand and the tenets of liberal legalism and Ameri-
can constitutionalism on the other.45 Similarly, Hope Babcock, in her cri-
tique of M’Intosh and the rest of the Trilogy, argues that for two hundred 
years European powers had been operating under the theory that the pre-
emptive right of the discovering nation was not to claim title to all tribal 
land but to enter into treaties with the native tribes.46 This argument is 
partly supported by historians such as Joseph Ellis, who has documented 
the efforts of the founding generation to reconcile expansionism with re-
publican values and the rights of Indians. While Ellis notes that the pre-
vailing view among Ameri cans in 1789 was that the United States owned 
everything east of the Mississippi by right of conquest and that most en-
dorsed the implicit imperialism of the push of white settlers westward, he 
also shows that George Washington was convinced by his secretary of war 
Henry Knox that the “conquest theory, which presumed that all Indians 
east of the Mississippi were mere ‘tenants at will,’ ” was a “gross violation 
of the republican principles” for which they had fought. It was Knox’s and 
ultimately Washington’s position that Indians should only be divested of 
their lands through purchases by or treaties with the federal government.47 
Despite the fact that the tide of settlers “swept all treaties, promises, ex-
cellent intentions, and moral considerations to the far banks of history,” 
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 Ellis’s history at least makes clear that conquest theory was not the only 
law under which the United States operated when it came to Indian land; 
despite the ambitions of the ﬂedgling nation, they would likely have been 
incapable of complete conquest had it come to that.48 Moreover, less than 
a decade later in the last of the trilogy of Indian cases, Marshall himself 
retreats from his position on discovery that he staked out in M’Intosh.49 
But from the perspective of Indian law it was too late; the damage had 
been done, the legal ﬁctions had grown into legal facts and become law.50
 Marshall’s reliance then on the doctrine of discovery can be seen as a 
classic example of legal translation as White envisions it, law translating 
law, the giving of new life to an old idea by placing it in a new context. But 
Marshall’s opinion also supports Cover’s insistence that legal interpreta-
tion is not nearly so tame as White suggests, that it is violence that makes 
legal interpretation possible, violence that gives Marshall the authority 
to make a judgment and assert it to be the law, and violence that enables 
him to disregard the other competing facts and narratives about the fed-
eral government’s relationship with Indian tribes. M’Intosh is law used to 
reduce rather than proliferate the possibilities of normative meaning, law 
in its imperial role rather than its peace- keeping role, law at its most vio-
lent.51 This is the violence of the word that also justiﬁes the violent acts 
the decision condoned and occasioned.
 The violence in Marshall’s opinion, however, resides not only in the 
words of the court, words that proclaim the undiluted power and legiti-
macy of the state relative to the Indians, but in the acts the words per-
form and validate. The words get their legal authority from violent acts 
previously done to Indians, acts which consolidated state power and em-
powered state law. The words also conﬁrm that the law may occasion fu-
ture violence as well, violence which will be subsequently condoned. Mar-
shall puts it bluntly: “The title by conquest is acquired and maintained by 
force.”52 In other words, the violence in the making of the state empow-
ers its courts to make commands backed by violence, commands that con-
tinue to do and authorize violence.
 One reason law’s images circulate so easily in popular culture is that 
law tells its stories in cultural terms as well as legal terms. Marshall builds 
his case for the deterritorialization of the Indians not only by narrating 
the legal doctrine of discovery but by portraying the “character and hab-
its” of the Indians themselves, a character which made the recourse to vio-
lence inevitable. In many respects Marshall writes the opinion as a mythic 
western romance, with brave and ﬁerce Indians admired for their indepen-
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dence but who ultimately succumb to the imperatives of the civilized state 
and manifest destiny, yet pass on a native claim to the land.53
But the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were ﬁerce savages, 
whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chieﬂy 
from the forest. To leave them in possession of their country, was to 
leave the country a wilderness; to govern them as a distinct people, 
was impossible, because they were as brave and as high spirited as 
they were ﬁerce, and were ready to repel by arms every attempt on 
their independence.
 What was the inevitable consequence of this state of things? 
The Europeans were under the necessity either of abandoning the 
coun try, and relinquishing their pompous claims to it, or of en forc-
ing those claims with the sword, and by the adoption of principles 
adapted to the condition of a people with whom it was impossible 
to mix, and who could not be governed as a distinct society, or of re-
maining in their neighborhood, and exposing themselves and their 
families to the perpetual hazard of being massacred.54
Richard Slotkin, in his masterful book on the mythology of the Ameri can 
frontier, articulates the power of the land in the early Ameri can mythic 
narratives, where the land was both a source of terror, potentiality, and vio-
lence. Exploration of the new land was one necessity for the colonists and 
ﬁghting Indians over it was another. “Later, the sons of these emigrants 
strove to justify their title to the land they took for their own.”55 Marshall’s 
opinion in M’Intosh is part of the myth- making about the Ameri can West, 
its cultural inﬂuence on par with its legal force.
Law’s Violence as West ern: Deadwood
No law at all in Deadwood . . . is that true?
—David Milch, Deadwood
Andre Bazin has called the western the “American ﬁlm par excellence” 
because it “was born of an encounter” between the mythology of the na-
tion’s founding and a unique form of expression—the cinema.56 Their ori-
gins were almost simultaneous and both have continued to thrive together. 
Tess Gallagher concurs in her genre study of the western: “In fact, so 
popu lar were the West erns during cinema’s formative years (1903–1911) 
that it may well be that, rather than the cinema having invented the West-
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ern, it was the West ern, already long existent in popular culture, that in-
vented the cinema. Picturesque scenery, archetypal character, dialectical 
story construction, long shots, close- ups, parallel editing, confrontational 
cross- cutting, montaged chases—all were explicit in the West ern before 
the Lumieres cranked their ﬁrst camera.”57
 West erns have consistently translated Ameri cans’ fascination with and 
ambivalence about the country’s founding as well as law’s own precarious 
relationship to violence, creating a visual afterlife of law’s violence that 
continues to prove gripping, telling the story in a new way each time. As 
Bazin says, “The West ern does not age.”58 And yet it goes on living, be-
cause it is also a temporal translation, and in each manifestation it looks 
back at a similar past through the eyes of a different present. Its stock 
tropes are those that form the mythic vocabulary of the common past: that 
elongated moment in which settlers forged into the frontier to violently 
wrest the land that was occupied by the Indians, but which was (as Mar-
shall only later conﬁrms in Johnson v. M’Intosh) rightfully theirs. It is the 
effort to civilize a powerful wilderness, to fulﬁll the ﬁrst principle of dis-
covery through the imperatives of Manifest Destiny and Empire.59
 Thus the coming of civilization and the development of law are cen-
tral themes of the western, but the western hero, the man who tames the 
wilderness sufﬁciently that law can enter, is not a part of civilization or 
law. The western hero, like the Ameri can hero he embodies, is a liberal in-
dividualist with a moral code who is part native and part civilizer, he has 
conquered the wilderness but neither has he been domesticated by the 
cosmopolitan and authoritarian East.60 He has evolved from the Hobbes-
ian state of nature but he is neither of nature nor of the state. He protects 
the ﬂedgling community and promises justice, but is not part of the com-
munity or bound by its rules. He is violent because he has to be not be-
cause he likes to be. In fact, he is incompatible with the state because of 
the very qualities that allow him to usher in the state: strength, conscience, 
and an individual liberty that would not submit to the institutionalization 
of the rule of law. As Manderson points out, the West ern hero is kin to 
the superhero, for each provides justice outside the constraints of the law. 
“It is their character and their power rather than their role or their training 
or their community that ensures that they are capable of bringing justice 
where law and society are at their most impotent.”61 Because the western 
hero is an outcast in the world he helps to create, Bazin argues that in the 
western “epic becomes tragedy, on the appearance of the ﬁrst conﬂict be-
tween the transcendence of social justice and the individual character of 
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moral justice, between the categorical imperative of the law which guar-
antees the order of the future city, and no less unshakeable order of the in-
dividual conscience.”62
 So westerns translate the state’s own use of violence in order to gain and 
maintain legitimacy and they depict the dependence of law on that fragile 
legitimacy, but the translation makes something new; its afterlife evinces 
a deeper ambivalence about both because there is a fundamental conﬂict 
between the classic western narrative and the classic western hero. While 
westerns often romanticize the hero, they can be skeptical or outright hos-
tile toward the state that the narrative enables. In this sense, westerns are 
part of a politically conservative genealogy that begins in liberal thought 
and runs through the present. The circulation of western translations of 
law has been profound and inﬂuential, and is evident in countless ex-
amples of law and culture, from the style and policy of the Reagan presi-
dency to recent Supreme Court cases like District of Columbia v. Heller, 
which mirrors some versions of the western narrative, valorizing, and in-
deed constitutionalizing, the individual with a gun over the needs and 
rights of the community.63 One sees vividly in Heller the power of the im-
ages that circulate in law’s visual afterlife to inﬂuence the law. Heller takes 
up an idea developed in the West ern, that violence “provides us with con-
ditions for self- deﬁnition,”64 and circulates it back into law.
 Deadwood, which premiered in 2005 and ran for three seasons, tells the 
story of a frontier Dakota camp as state governance and order encroach. 
Law is something feared and desired. Like one of the archetypal west-
erns, The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance, Deadwood’s translation of law’s 
violence is one which gives new life to a problem of irresolvable anxiety. 
Just as in Liberty Valance, law’s eventual stability is seen (and unseen) to be 
predicated on illegal acts of violence and a lie, in Deadwood the coming 
of law is paved by unspeakable but seen violence.
 Private violence is the reigning visual motif in Deadwood, as money or 
violence are the chief means of solving all disputes and most people don’t 
have money. Violence and death are not only a visual ﬁxation for the se-
ries but a practical problem for the town. The practical problem is solved 
by the town’s “Chinaman,” Mr. Wu, who for a small price will dispose of 
the dead bodies by feeding them to his enormous hogs. The implication 
is that this town has not been civilized yet by law and the lawlessness is so 
profound that even after the victims of violence are dead, still more vio-
lence awaits them.
 I want to focus on two telling scenes in Season 2 in a two- part epi-
Law’s Visual Afterlife 81
sode entitled “The Lie Agreed Upon” in which Al Swearengen and Seth 
Bullock play out the problem of law’s predicate violence. Swearengen of-
ﬁcially runs the Gem Saloon and unofﬁcially runs the camp. He is smart, 
ruthless, and oddly likeable. He is also desperate to protect his power in 
the face of competitors in town and the Dakota governor in Yankton. 
Bul lock has come to Deadwood to open a hardware store with his part-
ner Sol Star. Swearengen, who is a consummate po liti cal strategist, thinks 
they might be able to prolong their autonomy by giving the appearance 
of self- governance and lawfulness. To that end, Swearengen arranges to 
have Bullock “appointed” sheriff of the camp, a role Bullock both desires 
and repudiates, and a version of the role he had abandoned in Montana 
as the series opens. Yet once he accepts his reprised role as sheriff, he en-
dows it with all his fussy self- righteousness and rectitude. It is a perfor-
mance of authority that Swearengen ﬁnds politically useful and personally 
un bearable.
 In Deadwood we have two juxtaposed translations of the western hero, 
each with a different code, neither of which ﬁts the hero role. But then, 
this western is made in an era without heroes, when the democratic state 
and capitalism have together reached new heights of imperial violence, 
but seem inseparable. So it is not surprising that Bullock and Swearen-
gen are both businessmen and keepers of the law in Deadwood; but they 
are portrayed as very different types who have antipathy and only grudg-
ing respect for each other. On the one hand, Bullock is the silent moral-
ist, the upright entrepreneur, and the ambivalent but self- righteous law 
man. In many ways he presupposes the bureaucratization of law and vio-
lence in the police; he is impersonal, angry, quiet, as if all his energy goes 
to suppressing his own internal violence. Swearengen, on the other hand, 
is as expulsive as Bullock is retentive. He is a relentless talker, power- 
broker, and sleaze merchant. Unlike Bullock, he feels no need to reign in 
his violence, but neither does he unleash it without reason. Like the state 
and capitalism, these two appear to need each other despite their incom-
patibilities. As if to reinforce visually the sordid affairs of the town, there 
are very few epic shots in Deadwood, no horizons and open spaces. The 
one consistently elevated shot within the show is from the balcony of 
the Gem Saloon, from Swearengen’s perspective. The camera mainly stays 
within the claustrophobic rooms or oppressively muddy thoroughfare of 
the town.
 As season 2 opens, the town is concerned about its ability to protect 
its private property. In a revision of the appropriation of Indian land in 
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M’Intosh, the white settlers in Deadwood have set up a system of land 
grants outside the formal law and they are concerned that if they are incor-
porated into the Dakota Territory their land grants will not be respected. 
Their land grants are not only extralegal, but illegal, as Deadwood is an 
unauthorized settlement in Indian Country, an area reserved to Indians 
under treaty with the federal government. In this sense the scene and the 
series are the backstory to M’Intosh—these are the settlers who make each 
Indian treaty unenforceable and whose lust for property later requires 
Marshall to deny the prior tribal property claims.
 The season begins with Bullock consummating his affair with the wealthy 
widow Alma Garret in her hotel room and across the thoroughfare Swear-
engen is out on the balcony of the Gem Saloon. Swearengen is in a foul 
mood, having just learned that the Dakota governor plans to divide the 
area around Deadwood into three counties, each with an outside commis-
sioner, presumably immune to Swearengen’s bribes and threats. He watches 
with disgust as telegraph poles are being erected in town; law and civiliza-
tion are galloping toward them with a code he ﬁnds both unfamiliar and 
reprehensible. Swearengen says, “Messages from invisible sources. What 
some people think of as progress.” As his man Dan later adds, “America 
is coming, and they are lying, thieving cocksuckers.” While Swearengen is 
out on his balcony, Bullock emerges from the hotel looking self- satisﬁed 
and important. In his present state of mind, it is more than Swearengen 
can bear, and he says to Dan, “Self- deceiving cocksucker I am, I thought 
when America took us in Bullock would prove a fucking resource. Look at 
him, striding out like some randy, maniac Bishop.”65 And then louder, he 
taunts Bullock below for his ofﬁciousness and for his visit to the Widow 
Garret.
 Bullock later returns to the Gem Saloon to confront Swearengen, who 
simultaneously appeases and provokes him. Swearengen keeps talking, he 
has business to conduct, business more urgent than Bullock’s wounded 
dignity. He wants to know if Alma Garret will reinvest the money she is 
making on her gold claim in the town, and he needs Bullock’s help with 
the impending threat of government.
Swearengen: But does she cast her lot with the camp, furnish others here a 
chance to develop what they got, to hang on or even prosper?
Bullock: You pie- faced cocksucker. Get in here and account for your insult. 
Swearengen: Or, with you at her ear—among other points of entry— instead 
of doing your civic duty, does she ship her fucking loot to Denver?
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Bullock: Civic duty? Opposed by her own and her dead husband’s family, 
to put her assets at play in a camp with no law or government worth 
the name?
Swearengen: See as here where she lives and struck lucky, civic duty? Yeah. 
And it’s time for her and some others to quit their fucking shirking. 
Yankton’s making its move. Ah, the fucking thing!
Bullock: Meaning what? “Yankton’s making its move?” Without more in-
sults.
Swearengen: We’re getting ass- fucked. Carved into counties, but not one 
fucking commissioner coming from the hills.
Bullock: How do you have this information?
Swearengen: From the governor himself in a pricey little personal note . . . 
Now, I can handle my areas, but there’s dimensions and fucking angles 
I’m not expert at. You would be if you’d sheathe your prick long enough.
Bullock: Shut up.
Swearengen: And resume being the upright pain in the balls that graced 
us all last summer.
Bullock: Shut up, you son of a bitch.66
 Talk has run out and Swearengen sighs, accepting the ﬁght to come. 
Slowly, deliberately, and in silent close- ups, Bullock snaps off his badge 
and takes off his gun. He puts both of them neatly on Swearengen’s desk. 
His hand lingers on them, his back to Swearengen. Both of them face the 
camera, Swearengen in the background and Bullock in the foreground. 
Visually we are provided with distinctions, between two men, two differ-
ent versions of the western hero—one the individualist and brutal entre-
preneur who settles the edges of the known world but whose tactics are in-
compatible with settled law; the other the man who translates between the 
past and the future, the one who understands he has to take off his badge 
to do battle over a personal insult. It is not, of course, that the man with 
the badge is incapable of violence, but he understands that there are rules 
which distinguish legal and illegal violence.67 Thus we have the sec ond 
visual distinction, between the same man with and without a badge and 
gun. Then Bullock swivels around and they begin to ﬁght, eventually fall-
ing over the balcony and into the mud, bloody and bruised. The ﬁght ends 
when Swearengen’s men start shooting into the air and the stagecoach ar-
rives carrying a fresh batch of whores and Bullock’s new wife (his broth-
er’s widow) and stepson/nephew.
 Bullock returns later to retrieve his badge and gun, backed by Calamity 
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Jane and Charlie Utter. Everybody is armed; even the whore with the 
heart of gold, Trixie, has a riﬂe. Tensions are high and Bullock yells for 
Swearengen to come out. Swearengen interrupts his monologue about the 
confusing po liti cal situation, delivered during a blow job from Dolly the 
whore, to go down and meet Bullock. He refuses any weapons and walks 
out extending Bullock’s badge and gun. Swearengen seems to know that 
Bullock has considered leaving the camp with the Widow Garret, and 
gives a conciliatory speech:
I offer these. And I hope you’ll wear them a good long fucking time 
in this fucking camp, whoever’s fucking thumb we are under. And 
where it come to me just a few moments ago that the Rev. Smith—
may he rest his soul—he was found on the road apparently murdered 
by heathens just some months ago. What he said on the subject of 
you, “Mr. Bullock raises a camp up, and I hope he’ll reside with us 
and improve our general fucking atmosphere for a good long fuck-
ing time, even with all the personal complications and fucking di-
sasters that we all fucking have, and where running away solves ab-
solutely fucking nothing.”68
Swearengen has conceded to the coming state, as epitomized by the badge 
and gun of the sheriff, as a necessary evil, but he still wants Bullock on 
board so that as they become incorporated into the state they can protect 
their property and proﬁts.
 The last scene of the episode is one that ﬁrmly and self- consciously 
links capitol to the state. A. W. Merrick, the town’s newspaperman, wants 
a true account of the conﬂict between Bullock and Swearengen to print in 
the paper, and as he follows Swearengen up to his ofﬁce over the saloon, 
Swearengen teases him about how one strand of the story would be about 
the economic motives for the ﬁght, but the other would be about “pleasure 
beyond gain.”
Merrick: A more elevated perspective would construe our conduct as white 
men to be enacting a manifest destiny.
Swearengen: Whereas the warp, woof and fucking weave of my story’s tap-
estry would foster the illusions of further commerce, huh?
Swearengen lays down on his bed, and begins to dictate the article to Mer-
rick. As he speaks the camera cuts to Bullock walking slowly back to the 
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house he has built for his family as the camp falls into darkness. By Dead-
wood standards, it is a scene of extreme domestication. Both protagonists 
are heading to bed, having avoided an explosive and fatal encounter by 
paying their respects to the “implements and ornaments” of the law. The 
suggestion is that the law does not displace violence, it domesticates it. It 
makes the world safe for markets.
Swearengen: “Tonight, through out Deadwood heads may be laid to pillow 
assuaged and reassured, for that purveyor for proﬁt of everything sordid 
and vicious, Al Swearengen, already beaten to a fare- thee- well earlier in 
the day by Sheriff Bullock, has returned to the Sheriff the implements 
and ornaments of his ofﬁce. Without the tawdry walls of Swearengen’s 
saloon the Gem, decent citizens may pursue with a new and jaunty 
freedom all aspects of Christian commerce. In which connection, we 
particularly recommend—” There you’d throw in the names of a few 
businesses gave you good- sized adverts, huh?
 Here Swearengen’s speech is interrupted as Bullock reaches the door 
of his house to ﬁnd that his wife has waited up, to see whether he was go-
ing to come home or choose to leave town with the Widow Garret. The 
dialogue is momentarily synched with the image, which gives this scene 
within a scene more intimacy. Bullock and his wife talk quietly and for-
mally with each other, but in a way that acknowledges that Bullock has 
severed his relationship with Alma Garret and will do what is right by his 
family. He places his recovered gun and badge by the side of the sleeping 
boy so he’ll know that Bullock has retained his title and his masculinity, 
and he follows his wife upstairs. As they climb the stairs we hear Swearen-
gen’s voice again as the episode ends.
Swearengen: “A full fair- mindedness requires us also to report that within 
the Gem, on Deadwood’s main thoroughfare, comely whores, decently 
priced liquor and the squarest games of chance in the hills remain un-
abatedly available at all hours, seven days a week.”69
 This closing scene is noteworthy because it is a narrative transition 
from private violence (the ﬁght) to the seen but contained violence of the 
state (the returned implements and ornaments of the sheriff ’s ofﬁce) and 
to the unseen violence of capitalism (the town itself ). We see Swearengen 
acting as a translator, speaking the story for Merrick, translating the events 
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of the day and their complex backstory into a “true and decent” newspaper 
account. It shows the ways in which within the show Swearengen is also 
the translator for the viewer. This is made especially evident through the 
use of the voice- over, for within the frame of the episode he becomes our 
narrator, his voice speaks in a long- ago present about the imminent future, 
about a state wrought by violence that comes to make the market safe. In 
addition, his panoptic view from the balcony of the Gem Saloon affords 
him a visual power others don’t have. From there he translates the mo-
tives of the unseen state; the politics of the Territory; the doings within 
the camp; the laconic Bullock and the speechless Wu (who tellingly knows 
two words of English—Swearengen and cocksucker, which is the name of 
everyone else).
 In translating the state’s violent founding, Deadwood visualizes the 
gaps that were evident in Johnson v. M’Intosh. Within the context of a vio-
lent community we see the domestication necessary for law and capital, 
precisely the domestication that Marshall found Indians incapable of and 
which was used to justify the appropriation of their land. Where the Su-
preme Court found the establishment and continued existence of the na-
tion justiﬁed the means used to establish it, Deadwood sets the legal story 
in the moment of its violent making and makes clearer the multiple modes 
of violence needed to conquer the land: after a settler family is murdered 
on the road (probably by road agents) Swearengen offers ﬁfty dollars for 
the head of an Indian and keeps the severed head in a box in his ofﬁce; the 
women are conspicuously, sexually used and abused as part of the “cunt 
and whiskey” business; the Chinese, the blacks, and Sol Star, the “Hard-
ware Jew,” are all vividly denigrated. We see the costs and violence in the 
making of the state. Yet the rhe tori cal gaps of M’Intosh, the inability of 
Marshall to fully justify the property claims by the United States, still re-
sist translation.
 There remain gaps in law’s visual afterlife. For example, unspoken and 
unseen in Deadwood is the way the entire population of the town has 
been, in essence, deputized to take Indian land by the very absence of 
the federal government, which had previously agreed not to settle the 
land. They settle the land illegally but their unlawful actions are implicitly 
sanctioned by the government. They continue to resist the state that has 
enabled their independence and to denigrate the law that protects their 
proﬁ ts. Law’s violence and ambivalent legitimacy go on living in the trans-
lations of Deadwood, but they are masked anew in other ways, most no-
tably by the imperatives of capitalism. As Rebecca Johnson points out in 
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her essay on Deadwood, there is indeed law in the town, “it is the law of 
power, economy, and the law of the market. Deadwood may be an illegal 
camp on Indian land, but the people of Deadwood clearly function in the 
shadow of a binding economic order in which settler- society understand-
ings of exchange, property, and contract continue to operate.”70 In con-
trast to Johnson’s view that Deadwood makes capitalism and the civilizing 
effects of economic development feel inevitable,71 Patrick McGee, in his 
Marxist rereading of the history of the western, ﬁnds in Deadwood a de-
construction of capitalist culture and a “vivisection of the origin of capital 
and the damaging effect the war for wealth has on any kind of human re-
lationship.”72 My concern is less with deciding where Deadwood comes 
down with respect to capitalism, and more with seeing how its translations 
of law, violence, property, and the liberal self circulate. In Deadwood, law’s 
visual afterlife makes vivid the connections not only between M’Intosh and 
Heller, between the state, the individual, violence, and the market, but also 
the interdependence of legal and cultural interpretations.
West ern Science Fiction: Serenity
Can I make a suggestion that doesn’t involve violence, or is this the 
wrong crowd?
—Joss Whedon, Serenity
I want to touch ﬁnally on the sci- ﬁ subgenre of the futuristic western, be-
cause I think it provides a fruitful contrast to the western’s translations of 
law’s violence and state legitimacy projected into the past. In the western 
science ﬁction movie, the fantasy of lawlessness and anxiety over law’s vio-
lence are instead projected into the future, which gives the genre a differ-
ent mood, less elegiac and nostalgic, less a repetition of the origin myth.73 
Despite the differences of mood, however, there are striking similarities 
as each seeks to account for and critique its own present, to ﬁnd a fron-
tier and journey into the unknown, and to make sense of the nature of the 
state, its limitations and the law it legitimates.
 Science ﬁction as a genre develops out of many of the same  inﬂuences 
as the western: mythic narratives of western culture, pulp literature, and 
comics, although it was more profoundly inﬂuenced by the Industrial Revo-
lution, taking advanced industrial society as one of its primary themes.74 
Like the western, science ﬁction evolved with the cinema itself, most no-
tably in Melies’s early voyage ﬁlms, such as A Trip to the Moon in 1902, The 
Impossible Voyage in 1904, and 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea in 1907.75 But 
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science ﬁction cinema emerged more fully in the Machine Age following 
World War I, with Fritz Lang’s Metropolis in 1927 as a classic “expression 
of post- war angst and technological anxiety” that in many ways contin-
ues to epitomize the genre.76 The serials that ﬂourished in the 1930s were 
often sci- ﬁ- or western- inﬂected, and a few even mixed the two genres.77 
But it was in the atomic age that followed World War II that science ﬁc-
tion became a “critically recognized genre” and a mainstay of not only 
movie theaters but also early television,78 exempliﬁed by long- running se-
ries such as The Twilight Zone and Star Trek.
 Science ﬁction is so named because one of its deﬁning themes is the 
social and po liti cal anxiety generated by the use and abuse of science and 
technology. Ironically, the genre is among the most popular and lucrative 
in part because advances in cinematic technologies have allowed science 
ﬁction ﬁlms to capitalize on dazzling visuals and special effects. Like the 
western, science ﬁction often sets the story outside the current society, ei-
ther in the future, or on other planets.79 Also like westerns, the heroes of 
many science ﬁction ﬁlms are often themselves on the margins of human 
society or marginally human; they are renegades, don’t ﬁt in, are often out-
laws.80 While there are many different stock narratives within the genre, 
each dealing in some way with the social concerns of its time,81 my focus is 
on those ﬁlms that portray and translate the breakdown of the state and its 
monopoly on violence, a rupture in the social order, or the fantasy of law-
lessness. In this post- apocalyptic subgenre I would put ﬁlms like Planet of 
the Apes, Mad Max, The Road Warrior, and even Star Wars.
 In particular I want to showcase Serenity, a 2005 ﬁlm written and di-
rected by Joss Whedon (and spun off from his television series Fireﬂy), 
which was consciously modeled on the classic western Stagecoach and billed 
as a “space West ern.”82 In a sense the movie is a translation of a western 
into science ﬁction. It is also, like the western, a visual translation of law’s 
violence, although less about the domesticated violence of capitalism evi-
dent in Deadwood and more about the bureaucratized and mechanized 
violence of colonialism. The movie is set 510 years in the future in a new 
solar system that has been “terraformed” to sustain human life after people 
overwhelmed the resources of earth. The story revolves around the cap-
tain and crew of a cargo space ship named Serenity. The captain, Malcolm 
Reynolds (called “Mal”), had been a volunteer in the Independent army, 
but after losing the war he became a mercenary and a renegade. The pow-
er ful and authoritarian Alliance—an Ameri can- Chinese interplane tary 
 superpower—won the war and controls the central planets where they 
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use technology, indoctrination, and violence to create a utopia of “a better 
world” and a “true civilization.”
 The movie opens in an Alliance classroom where the teacher is telling 
the history of their new solar system, the dangerous outer planets, and the 
savage and barbarian Reavers. In the ﬁrst scene we are introduced to the 
“frontier,” the outer planets that have not been civilized, and the “savages” 
that partly populate the frontier. They are the stuff of campﬁre stories for 
Alliance children, but among the crew of Serenity they are a real threat. 
Mal and his crew must negotiate dual threats: “on the one hand, the Alli-
ance, with its enforced adherence to arbitrary laws, and, on the other, the 
Reavers, feral humans unrivaled in their anarchy and bestiality.”83 Unlike 
the myth of the western frontier, which despite its inhospitable landscape 
offered the promise of property and freedom, the frontier in Serenity is the 
farther reaches of space: cold, airless, and lethal, offering no promise of a 
better future. The crew often refers to it as “nothing” or “the black.” The 
other children in the classroom can’t understand why the other planets 
don’t want to be safe and civilized. A student named River responds, guid-
ing the audience’s understanding of the ﬁlm. Within the ﬁlm, she also re-
orients the teacher’s narrative for her classmates, translating it into a story 
about colonialism. “We meddle,” she says. “People don’t like to be med-
dled with. We tell them what to do. . . . We are in their homes and in their 
heads and we haven’t the right. We’re meddlesome.”84
 River turns out to be “a reader,” a psychic, who the Alliance imprisons 
and trains to be a human weapon for them. She is a classic sci- ﬁ character, 
the human turned into machine. She undergoes “neural stripping,” which 
makes her mentally unstable and physically powerful, but the process is 
not completed before her brother Simon rescues her and they take refuge 
aboard Serenity. Mal and his crew don’t realize who they are harboring, 
or that an “operative” for the Alliance is searching for River. The opera-
tive is a brutal, cold, methodical killer, willing to do whatever it takes for 
a “better world.” He is a true believer in the Alliance cause of a safer uni-
verse and villainous because of it. The operative embodies human violence 
made clean and technical. Mal, in contrast, is a skeptic and a reluctant pio-
neer, his ship is his only home and the crew his only family.85
 Despite the landscape of space and the violent technologies of the Al-
liance and its operative, in the intimate details of Serenity there is more of 
the visual iconography of the western than of science ﬁction. Mal’s voice 
and clothing, as much as his character, are in the tradition of the western 
hero. He wears a leather holster and gun, speaks in a western idiom, has 
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his own moral compass, but will kill when he needs to. Like Bullock in 
the opening scene of Deadwood, Mal kills a man to keep him from being 
torn apart by Reavers. It’s not exactly a legal killing, but it’s a merciful and 
moral one. There are many camera shots that speak in the cinematic idiom 
of the western as well: a showdown shot from close behind Mal, his gun 
and holster foregrounded, a bar- room brawl, a chase scene that feels more 
western than galactic (even though its vehicle is a hovercraft rather than a 
stagecoach).
 In Serenity, not only is the western itself translated into the future, but 
like the western, it seeks to translate into a visual popular vernacular key 
legal scenes and preoccupations. Here the violence of the state’s found-
ing moment and law’s paradoxical dependence on violence depicted in the 
western becomes the violence in the maintenance of the state and of em-
pire; the dangers of utopian dreams and progress narratives; an imagined 
social space where the state’s law is violent and less predictable than the 
violence of the lawless Reavers. In Serenity we see and must confront not 
only the costs of the state, but also of empire building in the name of prog-
ress. Foregrounded in this translation is not the market, but colonialism, 
and the desire of a superpower to bring civilization to those they do not 
understand. Serenity, in translating the western itself, gives it a sci- ﬁ after-
life in which we both appreciate and question afresh the western’s charac-
ters and world- making categories. For example, it shares with the classic 
westerns a suspicion of the state and conventional social order, but adds a 
postcolonial sense of the injustice done to others in the name of civiliza-
tion. It shares with Deadwood a twenty- ﬁrst- century rejection of heroes. 
In this ﬁlm a hero is “someone who gets other people killed.”86 Serenity re-
places the lone western hero, the liberal individualist, with a small com-
munity, a chosen family. The crew of Serenity is a family of mercenary 
outlaws on the “raggedy edge” of the solar system; they seek freedom from 
the authoritarianism of the Alliance but they do not need or want the in-
dividual freedom offered by classical legal thought. Modeled on the Ford-
ian community of Stagecoach,87 this community goes even farther to cre-
ate a workable social order, abiding by its own set of norms and values, of 
which trust is primary. It is not perfect, but it works well enough that it 
helps each of its members become more self- realized. Whether in a stage-
coach or a spaceship, they are literally and ﬁguratively on a journey to-
gether.
 Serenity is skeptical of the imperialist and progressive state, but it is 
equally skeptical of idealism and utopianism. It shows us that living with 
violence, even legally sanctioned violence, is probably better than trying 
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to create a world without violence. The Reavers, we learn toward the end 
of the movie, were once ordinary humans on a planet named Miranda 
who had an unpredictable reaction to a drug used by the state to make the 
population less aggressive and happier.88 When the crew of Serenity land 
on Miranda, they ﬁnd a planet ﬁlled with sharp light and corpses. They 
also ﬁnd a holographic report about what happened: 
“There’s been no war here, no terraforming event….It’s the ‘Pax’—
the G- 32 Paxilon Hydroclorate—that we added to the air proces-
sors….It was supposed to calm the population, weed out aggression…. 
It worked. The people here stopped ﬁghting. And then they stopped 
everything else. They stopped going to work, stopped breeding, talk-
ing, eating. There’s thirty million people here and they all just let 
themselves die….about a tenth of a percent of the population had 
the opposite reaction to the Pax. Their aggressor response increased 
beyond madness. They’ve become—they’ve killed most of us; not 
just killed, they’ve done things. . . . We meant it for the best.”89
 The Reavers, it turns out, are that tenth of a percent. They are not alien 
others, nor are they “like us”; they are us.90 Indeed, this awareness is a po-
tential repudiation of the legalized violence of the colonial project. As 
Homi Bhabha says, “colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, rec-
ognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not 
quite.”91 While the story of the Reavers’ creation re- forms them for the 
viewer, to be almost the same, but not quite, their story also collapses the 
distinction between native and colonizer. While they are clearly savage, 
they are just as clearly not native. They are the savage result of the imperial 
project itself. If anything, they embody White’s theory of translation as 
the art of confronting the unbridgeable discontinuities between people,92 
as a way to consider right or more just relations. In fact, it is the holo-
graphic report and the realization of its full meaning that acts as an emo-
tional catalyst on Mal, who until then was neither a true believer like those 
in the law- making Alliance nor a nonbeliever like the lawless Reavers. He 
is complicated, liminal, and agnostic. Despite a deep antipathy to the Al-
liance, Mal and his crew are also culturally part of the Alliance, speaking 
in English and cursing in Chinese. Moreover, they depend on the capi-
talism that Empire feeds.93 But now Mal takes a stand, saying to his crew, 
“They think they can make people better. And I don’t hold to that. So, no 
more running. I aim to misbehave.”
 Their misbehavior is to broadcast the holographic report, so that people 
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know the truth about the Alliance, and to do this he turns to a young 
hacker named Mr. Universe, who is a subversive techie who ﬁnds freedom 
in his media “feeds,” in the constant stream of images and information, in 
the multiple frames of his postmodern life. In a comic touch, he is married 
to a cyborg Barbie. As Mr. Universe says, “You can’t stop the signal Mal. 
Everything goes somewhere and I go everywhere.” In a world in which 
God is dead, Mr. Universe is the high- tech substitute. He sees all. In the 
character of Mr. Universe, Serenity takes up the theme of visuality itself. It 
operates under the assumption that all modern communication and trans-
lation is in some sense visual. The screens in this new solar system not only 
project images, they see as well; the private is always public, the Alliance 
watches through the television screen. The screen images also send code 
and subliminal signals that activate their mind control over River. But in 
Serenity visuality is not just about state control and state violence. A tool 
of law enforcement, visuality also deﬁes the law. As Mr. Universe makes 
clear, once visuality becomes pervasive enough to be universal, it cannot be 
totalizing or totally controlled. It becomes more like air than like law. Thus 
the universality of the image in Serenity is also what makes the image un-
manageable, and once it is unmanageable it is also a source of salvation: 
a medium for resisting or attacking the state as well as being subjected to 
state observation and control. When the problem of state legitimacy and 
violence is translated into the future, through the idiom of science ﬁction, 
the violence is also digital and bloodless.
 The ﬁnal confrontation between Mal and the operative is a western 
scene in a sci- ﬁ setting—it takes place on a screen. The operative has killed 
everyone who has sheltered or helped the crew of Serenity, in clud ing Mr. 
Universe. Mal confronts him not with a weapon, but with morality, and a 
debate about whether the world to come is one that will allow for compet-
ing claims of the good.
Mal: I don’t murder children.
Operative: I do. If I have to. . . . I believe in something greater than myself. 
A better world. A world without sin.
Mal: So me and mine got to lay down and die so you can live in your bet-
ter world?
Operative: I’m not going to live there. There’s no place for me there. Any 
more than there is for you.94
Like the villains and heroes of westerns, there is no place for them in the 
world that they are ushering in. They live by different rules. And yet, in 
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Serenity the characters grow, and as they do they have increased agency. 
Mal ﬁnds he does believe in something, and discovers his own capacity for 
love (which is “the ﬁrst rule of ﬂying”). River comes to own and control 
her violent power, and she is the one who emerges at the end as the real 
western hero, the one who single- handedly takes out the Alliance attack-
ers, using violence illegally but for a just cause. Unlike the western, this 
story of law’s violence is in the future rather than the past, so the audience 
doesn’t know how the story of civilization ends; we don’t know whether 
humans will be able to survive together or not.
Conclusion
What does the visual and temporal translation of law’s violence tell us 
when it is projected through westerns into the past and the future? That 
the just state is an oxymoron? That the just state is always founded on an 
injustice and maintained through sanctioned violence? That it will never 
escape its violent origins? That its very existence is fragile and unstable? 
The brilliance of Deadwood and Serenity is not that they answer these 
questions but that they ask them. They show us how the anxieties pro-
duced by the paradoxical relationship between law and violence continue 
to play out in our cultural and po liti cal lives, spurred by advanced capi-
talism and colonialism; how these concerns have changed and been re-
newed in law’s visual afterlife; and how they will continue to produce, in 
Benjamin’s words, an “echo of the original.”95 Law’s visual afterlife shows 
us its own power—it allows us to relive a primal anxiety produced by our 
founding and our law, and relive it in aesthetically pleasurable ways. It also 
shows us the power of law’s visual afterlife to usher in new understandings 
of law and social order. It is often through popular visual culture that we 
rediscover, sometimes in all its ingloriousness, “the foundation of the law 
which would make order out of chaos, separate heaven and earth. But per-
haps the cinema was the only language capable of expressing this, above 
all of giving it its true aesthetic dimension. Without the cinema the con-
quest of the West would have left behind, in the shape of the West ern 
story, only a minor literature.”96
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